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in to
staff
began a search for alternate defender
organizations to break what government
officials saw as a monopoly on the
delivery of indigent defense services.
Concerned that the city would solicit
with the narrow goal of cost containment rather than providing quality services, the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, First Department,
at the urging of local bar associations,
created an eight-member oversight
committee of lawyers to monitor the
effects of the decision to contract with
multiple providers. As more local and
state governments nationwide turn to
competitive contracts for criminal indigent defense services, the experiences
of New York City's private bar initiative may prove useful for other jurisdictions attempting to set standards and
goals to ensure quality services and
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protect criminal defense services from
political and fiscal pressures.
The confrontation between The
Legal Aid Society (LAS) and the city
began when the Association of Legal
Aid Attorneys, the LAS lawyers' union,
voted to strike over low wages and a 15
percent increase in individual caseloads. In a city where close to 900 individuals are arrested and detained each
day, and where each of those persons
must be represented by counsel in order
to be arraigned, a strike by defense
providers can disrupt the courts and jam
arrest processing. The strike incensed
city government officials and the
mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, who threatened to terminate The Legal Aid
Society's long-standing contract with
the city and to withhold payments due.
He also demanded a $16 million dollar
retroactive cut in the LAS budget.
Finally, he told striking lawyers that
unless they returned to work, they
would be permanently barred from

practicing as criminal defense lawyers
for both LAS or the city's assigned
counsel plan.
The threats worked. The union
ended the strike and the lawyers quickly returned to court. The mayor, however, was not satisfied. He took action
to ensure that he would never again
depend so heavily upon a single unionized provider of criminal defense services. The next year, he dramatically
reduced the size of LAS's city contract,
forcing the layoff of dozens of experienced lawyers and drastically reducing
training and supervision for the staff. At
the same time, he issued a request for
proposals (RFP) soliciting potential
providers of criminal defense services
in each borough. The RFP invited new
organizations to represent 12,500 indigent individuals in Manhattan and
10,000 in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and
Queens. In Staten Island the new
provider would completely replace
LAS. Two new appeals offices would
each represent 250 clients. For the
first time LAS faced competition. The
organized bar, meanwhile, reacted
with alarm.
The local bar associations were
aware that New York City was not the
first jurisdiction to experiment with
defense services contracts, which are
becoming increasingly popular. The
most recent survey by the Bureau of
Justice Statistics reports that no contracts for defense services existed in
1972; however, by 1986, contracts were
in use in 6 percent of all counties
nationwide and 14 percent of all counties with a population of one million or
more. Ten years later it is likely that
those numbers have grown exponentially. But as contracts proliferate, they
have been criticized by courts, the academic community, and the American Bar
Association.
Fixed-price contracts are the most
worrisome. In a fixed-price contract, a
lawyer or group of lawyers agrees to
handle all assignments in a given jurisdiction over a set period of time for a
set price. Such a scheme is attractive to
states and local governments concerned
with containing costs and accurately
predicting expenditures, but fixed-price
contracts risk reducing quality of

services, especially when
contracts are awarded
through competitive bidding.
Further, contract organizations risk jeopardizing their
professional independence as
allegiances gravitate towards
funding sources rather than
clients.
Recognizing the potential
for problems, the ABA
Standardsfor Criminal
Justice: ProvidingDefense
Services warn that contracts
should not be awarded "primarily on the basis of cost"
and suggest that contracts for
services include terms and
conditions designed to ensure
quality representation and
professional independence.
Robert Spangenberg, an
expert consultant in criminal
justice and defense services,
opposes the use of the fixedprice contracts, preferring
conagreements that bind the
a
only
tractor to representing
fixed number of clients or
cases for a set price.
Although such an arrangement is no guarantee against
the risk that cases will turn
out to be complex, requiring
more lawyer and expert hours
than anticipated, it does
afford more protection than
an open-ended contract that
forces an organization to handle all
arrests and resulting prosecutions within
its jurisdiction. Unfortunately, many
contractors across the county have
agreed to fixed-price, open-ended contracts. In fact, as the bar associations
were later to discover, this is exactly the
predicament in which LAS now found
itself.
Concerned that the city would pick
the cheapest, most efficient defense
provider rather than the best-equipped
and most dedicated to delivering quality

services, the New York County
Lawyers' Association, joined by the
Association of the Bar of the City of
New York and the Bronx Bar
Association, first approached the city to
establish an oversight mechanism.
When the city declined, the associations
drafted rules for the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, to establish an oversight
committee responsible for shielding the
quality of defense services from costdriven politics. The rules enacted as
Part 603 of the Supreme Court,
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Appellate Division, First Department
Court Rules create an eight-member
Indigent Defense Organization
Oversight Committee with the
authority and responsibility to monitor
the provision of all defense services in
the First Department-the Bronx and
Manhattan -and to consider all matters pertaining to the performance and
professional conduct of such organizations and the individual attorneys in
their employ.
Recognizing that an honest evaluation of defense services would be controversial, difficult to accomplish, and
potentially open to misinterpretation by
political adversaries, the oversight committee began its supervisory task cautiously. Public defense systems,
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whether public defenders, contract
offices, or private bar plans, have been
virtually exempt from public scrutiny
despite the burgeoning numbers of
defense offices and the growing cadre
of private lawyers who provide defense
services at public expense. Criticism of
defense services has focused generally
on the performance of individual attorneys on individual cases. Even the
comprehensive McConville and Mirsky
report, CriminalDefense of the Poor in
New York City, 15 N.Y.U. Rev. L. &
Soc. Change 581 (1986-87), which
criticized the work of all the city's
defenders, failed to suggest how the
organizations might help staff improve
performance. Studies of public defense
systems concentrate on funding, with
failures and shortcomings attributed to
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lack of financial support. Written by
defense consultants in order to generate
more funding or by death penalty abolitionists whose insights can be lost in
the fray over the sanction, conclusions
lack objectivity and have failed to capture the public's interest. Whether the
public does not believe the diagnosis or
is simply unconcerned about the quality
of services, no one pays a great deal of
attention to how well a public defense
organization works.
The courts, too, rarely comment.
Members of the bench seldom participate in efforts to monitor attorney performance (apart from Rule 11 sanctions
in the federal system) and only overturn
convictions when the quality of representation sinks to the level of constitutional "ineffectiveness"-a standard

rarely satisfied on appeal.
With limited resources,
defense organizations do make
hard choices every day about
where to spend their funds.
Starting salaries are low.
Investigators and expert witnesses are scarce. Organizations are perennially understaffed, overworked, and in
crisis. But the committee questioned whether it was fair to
attribute all difficulties to
financial stress. In the world
of criminal court there is little
motivation to perform well.
No one gets a salary increase
for winning a case or creating
a new legal theory. Promotions
within a public defender office
are rare and not always awarded on merit. Clients are notori-

ously dissatisfied, so gratitude
is scarce. Courts and prosecutors often view zealous
defense work as wasting precious time, so that often those
lawyers who grease the wheels
of justice are more popular
than those who put on the
brakes with their fervent representation. Finally, the public
identifies public defenders
with their clients-dishonest
0:,
and sneaky. In criminal court,
obstacles to achieving excellence combine with lack of
incentive.
The committee debated whether its
monitoring might help the defender organizations to improve funding and remind
funding sources of the importance of
investing in defense services. The committee also considered what a public
defender office could do to motivate a
young and idealist staff, such as training,
supervision, and evaluation, in addition
to better promotional opportunities and a
chance at recognition.

Standards and guidelines
With all these considerations in mind, the
oversight committee drafted standards and
guidelines with the primary goal of creating a
yardstick for defense services organizations
against which to measure performance and
the hope that a practical set of standards serve

multiple purposes, including:
0 educating a skeptical public about what it
takes to provide quality defense services;
* promoting an understanding of why adequate funding is necessary (to engender
public support for more spending); and
* providing notice to the organizations
themselves of what is expected of a publicly funded defense office.
National and local bar associations have
drafted several standards relevant to the
task of providing criminal defense services.
Most assigned counsel plans, for example,
have qualification standards for screening
lawyers in criminal defense cases. Those

and what kind of supervision should be
available; and where the caseload limits
ought to be set for felonies, misdemeanors,
and appeals.
The committee's starting point was the
ABA Standardsfor CriminalJustice: Providing Defense Senices (third edition),
drafted by the Criminal Justice Standards
Committee of the Criminal Justice Section
and approved with commentary in 1992.
Also useful was the NLADA's Guidelines
for NegotiatingandAwarding Governmental Contractsfor CriminalDefense Services, adopted in 1984, as well as standards
developed by state public defender commissions in Washington, Massachusetts,
and Indiana. Each set
was intended to assist
and
defense organizaLions in obtaining
funding, and every
set contained useful
ideas. Overall, however, the existing
standards employed
broad, general language, ill-suited for the
purposes of monitoring the defense system.
The ABA standards, for example, require
"reasonable compensation levels (Standard
5-3.2) ...a policy for handling conflicts of
interest cases (Standard 5-3.3(vii)...
workload limits for individual lawyers (v).
..supervision, evaluation, training, and
professional development (xi) ...a system
of case management and reporting (xiv)."
And, none provided answers to two major
questions: Who monitors the contract
providers for compliance? And, what sanctions are imposed if the providers are found
not to be in compliance?

Without monitoring
consequences, standar Js have
little bite.

standards concentrate on a lawyer's qualifications and experience. The ABA and the
National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) have each adopted performance standards for prosecutors and defense attorneys that focus on an individual
lawyer's responsibilities when representing
an individual client. Those standards emphasize what tasks (e.g., motion practice,
investigation, plea bargaining, or sentencing advocacy) ought to be conducted on
any individual case. But the committee's
approach was organizational, not individual. The comnittee was less interested in
attorney qualifications than in how a defender office ensures that its lawyers are
qualified; less interested in defining effective advocacy than in how a defender office enssures that its staff performed zealously. The committee's goal was to
establish minimum protocols for hiring,
training, supervising, supporting, and evaluating lawyers--the practicalities of running an office. These types of standards
were rare indeed.
Based on existing standards and the experience of committee members and other
defenders, the committee detennined what
the lawyer/investigator ratio should be;
how much training and continuing legal
education should be provided; how much

Creating a yardstick
The committee realized that its eight
volunteer members would be responsible
not just for defining how organizations
ought to assist lawyers, but also for on-site
inspections to verify whether the organizations really provided the support they
claimed. Detailed standards would be easier to use than vague pronouncements open
to multiple interpretations. A standard simply requiring "training" isn't much help
when it comes time to inspect an organization. The organization might claim that its
one-week introductory course satisfies a
"training" requirement, while the inspec-

tion team might determine that "training"
requires on going continuing legal education. An organization might believe that
hiring a single investigator satisfies a standard that requires "sufficient investigatory
staff," while the review committee might
have quite a different idea. Thus, in drafting
the standards, specifics were included
where possible, without any particular organization in mind, to give the organizations clear notice of expectations and to reduce post monitoring debates.
The oversight committee's performance
standards, entitled GeneralRequirements
for All OrganizedProvidersqf Defense
Services to Indigent Defendants, is divided
into 10 sections: professional independence; qualifications of lawyers; training;
supervision; workloads; evaluation, promotion, and discipline; support services; case
management and quality control; compliance with standards of professional responsibility; and reporting obligations. Each
section is divided into three parts: performance standards, evaluation criteria, and a
commentary. [For details, see sidebar "Performance Standards.']
Failure to meet the specific guidelines
would not necessarily mandate a finding
that the organization is not providing quality representation, but the burden to explain
how it was accomplishing the goal would
be on the organization. "In such cases, the
defense organization must demonstrate that
it has adopted equivalent practices and procedures suitable to its particular structure
and method of operation to ensure adherence to each of the Performance Standards."
Before finalizing the standards, the
oversight committee solicited comments
from interested defender organizations, including those that would be evaluated on
the basis of compliance with the standards.
Most of the standards were accepted without discussion. One area that generated
controversy was the workload/caseload
standard. The Legal Aid Society, in particular, thought that the committee's decision to
count cases at the point of intake-arraignments--would result in its lawyers' caseloads exceeding the standard. LAS argued
that cases should be counted post arraignment, pointing out that many matters are
disposed of at the first stage of a criminal
proceeding, and arguing that pending post
intake cases should be the only ones counted as a measure of workload. The commitCRIMINAL JUSTICE
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tee considered this argument, but being unsure whether more cases are disposed of at
intake in New York City than in other major
cities, members declined to adopt numbers
that differed from the nationally accepted
workload standards.

Monitoring
Compliance inspections and rebuttable
presumptions were also contentious. Robert
Spangenberg wrote that "the monitoring of
these standards would result in a system of
accreditation or certification, which does not
exist in any indigent defense system in the
country?' He warned that such a system has
serious problems because it doesn't take
"into account available resources... ; the
rigidity of certification standards would not
leave room for innovative approaches that
public defenders are taking towards improved representation; and ... the monitoring of performance standards requires a
substantial staff of both attorneys and nonattorneys"
But without monitoring and the possibility of ramifications based on observable findings, the standards would have little bite.
There seemed little purpose in drafting another set of goals that could be breached
without regard for consequences. The oversight committee wanted to establish a workable and practical list of minimum requirements, which if not achieved would signify
that the organization could not be certified
as providing quality representation. The
committee decided that the difficulty of the
task was not an argument for refusing to
begin, and because the presumption was rebuttable, not conclusive, the general requirements would be flexible enough to permit
innovation.
Once the standards were promulgated on
July 1, 1996, the committee began its monitoring work. Although New York had not
yet contracted with any new organizations to
provide defense services in the First Department, existing providers were within the
oversight committee's sphere of responsibility. They included The Legal Aid Society
(which has separate trial offices in the Bronx
and Manhattan and an appellate unit), the
Office of the Appellate Defender (a small
office providing representation on criminal
appeals), and the Neighborhood Defender
Service of Harlem (a trial office that was
started by the VERA Institute of Justice as a
demonstration project).
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First, the oversight conmmittee asked
each organization to submit written documentation of its compliance with the general requirements by responding to a questionnaire requesting specific information.
Answers could be supplemented with any
relevant material. [See sidebar "Questionnaire on Qualifications"]
After receiving the organizations' submissions, members of the committee, accompanied by additional volunteers from
the three participating bar associations, visited the three defense organization offices
and interviewed a number of the personnel
to verify the written information. In other
words, if an organization claimed to provide continuing legal education (CLE), the
inspection team looked to see what was ac-

tually provided. Teams asked the lawyers
not simply whether CLE was available, but
whether it was available at a time they
could attend and whether the offerings
were useful to their practice. Thus, the inspections were both in-depth and extensive.
Committee members met, for example,
every member of the staff of the Office of
the Appellate Defender and 29 lawyers
with the Manhattan office of the LAS criminal defense division.
Teams met with clerks, data input specialists, social workers, investigators, administrators, supervisors, and staff lawyers
in an effort to question each about all the
areas covered by the standards. To a much
lesser extent, the committee interviewed
judges, criminal defense practitioners, and

others familiar with the activities of the
three organizations. After the interviews
were completed, each team distilled the resuits into a subcommittee report, from
which, along with the organizations' written submissions, the oversight committee
drafted a first annual report.

Can quality survive inNYC?
The report found that "as of the fall of
1996, each of the three defense organizations provides quality representation generally meeting the Standards." It noted, however, that there were certain substantial
problems that, if not corrected, would compromise the quality of services provided in
New York City. The most troublesome
finding was that The Legal Aid Society's
caseload far exceeded the numbers designated in the committee's general requirements and specific guidelines, presumptively violating Performance Standard V,
which requires lawyers "to maintain manageable workloads in order to permit them
to render quality representation to each individual client" Because the committee
had questions about the propriety of applying the nationally accepted caseload numbers to New York City defense organizations, and its intent in this initial monitoring
was not to punish any organization but to
assist it to improve the quality of representation, the committee decided:
Legal Aid's contractual arrangements
with the City require it to represent all
indigent persons arrested (except conflict cases) for whom other arrangements are not available. Because the
City's current anti-crime efforts include
making a rising number of arrests, Legal
Aid is required to handle an ever increasing number of cases with a reduced
budget and staff. As a result, both New
York and Bronx CDDs' workloads
greatly exceeded the Oversight Committee's Guidelines. [If that situation
continues] the Committee is concerned
that the quality of Legal Aid's representation will necessarily continue to be
eroded.
In the absence of some contractual
guaranty of acceptable caseload limits
or fiscal provision for increasing caseloads, there does not appear to be any
assurance that Legal Aid can meet the
Oversight Committee's workload guide-

lines in the future. The current arrangement is likely to result in a reduction of
quality representation.
The committee found that LAS's failure
to establish and comply with caseload limits was adversely affecting staff morale and
delivery of services. This problem, identified as early as 1971 by the Appellate Division Committee, must now be resolved. In
an attempt to remain the primary defender
in New York City, LAS had agreed to represent all indigent criminal clients (an expanding clientele) for a single, fixed price,
which put it in an untenable position. The
struggle to provide services in court with
fewer lawyers and a smaller budget is inevitably impinging upon training and supervision. Regarding supervision, the oversight committee found:
In addition to its caseload levels, at
Legal Aid's New York CDD, the ratio of
supervisors to staff does not meet the
Oversight Committee's Specific Guideline. As Legal Aid staff lawyers struggle
to cope with larger workloads, the adequacy of supervision becomes ever
more important. Legal Aid has tried to
compensate for the sharp reduction in
numbers of supervisors at both the trial
and appellate levels by employing new
training methods, oversight and review
of staff lawyers' work product. Nevertheless, particularly at New York CDD,
there has been a noticeable diminution
of in-court supervision which, if allowed
to continue, will adversely affect quality.
Finally, the standards highlighted trends
cutting across the New York City criminal
justice system:
As the City's anti-crime efforts pour
thousands of additional misdemeanor
cases into the system, Legal Aid risks
evolving into a misdemeanor defense
organization. The City's contracts with
alternate offices for portions of the defense work in the Second Depatment,
and its 1996 RFP to handle cases not
being handled by Legal Aid in New
York and Bronx Counties, require that
the contracting organizations hire only
lawyers qualified to handle felonies.
Thus, new lawyer training in criminal
defense work is likely to depend even
more in the future on the efforts of

Legal Aid, which will be employing all
new, inexperienced lawyers, and providing misdemeanor representation and
training for the criminal defense bar. Accordingly for the long term future, it is
important that the training functions of
Legal Aid be maintained and enhanced.
Since the committee's initial report, New
York City has negotiated contracts with
three new defense organizations in the First
Department, bringing to seven the number
of new defense providers in the city. The
Bronx Defenders and the New York County
Defender Services began accepting trial
court assignments in September 1997. The
Center for Appellate Litigation is handling
appeals. As anticipated, the city reduced
Legal Aid Society's budget to fund these
new offices. It is still too early to anticipate
whether the young organizations will be
funded at a level sufficient to meet the oversight committee's general requirements or
whether the cuts to LAS's budget will render
it incapable of reducing caseloads. The committee will begin its second round of monitoring-focusing on the new institutionsthis spring, issuing a report in late 1998.
Hopefully, the standards have made the
public as well as those in city government
aware of the complexity of providing quality
services, stimulating service providers to
better support staff with training, supervision, and case management tools.
But what happens if the organized defense providers fail to meet the standards?
Because the oversight committee is an accrediting body of the appellate division, it is
likely the appellate division would instruct
its trial judiciary to refrain from assigning
cases to employees of "de-certified" organizations--in effect, preventing the new
organizations from handling any cases,
despite their contract with the city. Such a
face-off would certainly result in litigation.
Meanwhile, the work of the Indigent
Defense Organization Oversight Committee
proves that practical standards can be drafted, and that armed with standards, even a
small committee of volunteer lawyers can
evaluate criminal defense services. The next
step is to insist during funding negotiations
that are taking place in New York City and
across the country that the defender offices
are provided with the support and resources
they need to meet the standards, practice
competently, and represent their clients. N
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